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We have proposed the FalseTaggingTheory (FTT) as a neurobiological model of belief and
doubt processes.The theory posits that the prefrontal cortex is critical for normative doubt
toward properly comprehended ideas or cognitions. Such doubt is important for advanta-
geous decisions, for example in the financial and consumer purchasing realms. Here, using
a neuropsychological approach, we put the FTT to an empirical test, hypothesizing that focal
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) would cause a “doubt deficit” that
would result in higher credulity and purchase intention for consumer products featured in
misleading advertisements. We presented 8 consumer ads to 18 patients with focal brain
damage to the vmPFC, 21 patients with focal brain damage outside the prefrontal cor-
tex, and 10 demographically similar healthy comparison participants. Patients with vmPFC
damage were (1) more credulous to misleading ads; and (2) showed the highest inten-
tion to purchase the products in the misleading advertisements, relative to patients with
brain damage outside the prefrontal cortex and healthy comparison participants. The pat-
tern of findings was obtained even for ads in which the misleading bent was “corrected”
by a disclaimer. The evidence is consistent with our proposal that damage to the vmPFC
disrupts a “false tagging mechanism” which normally produces doubt and skepticism for
cognitive representations. We suggest that the disruption increases credulity for mislead-
ing information, even when the misleading information is corrected for by a disclaimer.This
mechanism could help explain poor financial decision-making when persons with ventro-
medial prefrontal dysfunction (e.g., caused by neurological injury or aging) are exposed to
persuasive information.
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INTRODUCTION
It may seem like a stroke of good luck to be contacted by a
Nigerian prince who is in trouble. The individual often claims
to have some connection to a large fortune but needs a foreign
investor’s help to access it. Victims of this fraud scheme may send
thousands of dollars to this individual with the promise of a 10-
fold payoff in return. Unfortunately for victims, the reward never
arrives.
Fraud, an intentional deception made for personal gain, is a
crime and has reached epidemic levels in older adults. An esti-
mated 7.3 million adults 65 years of age or older (20% of older
Americans) have been the victims of financial fraud according
to a 2010 survey (Infogroup/ORC, 2010). Research has suggested
older adults are disproportionally vulnerable to fraud and decep-
tion in general (Gaeth and Heath, 1987; Chen and Blanchard-
Fields, 2000; Chen, 2002, 2007). However, we remain without
an adequate understanding of the elderly individual’s propensity
toward credulity when exposed to persuasive messages. More-
over, we still do not understand the neuroanatomical mechanisms
which (1) are critical in belief and doubt processes, and (2) might
show disproportional dysfunction in connection with age-related
increases in credulity. A central goal of our research is to investigate
the underlying neuroanatomical mechanisms which are engaged
when one becomes dubious or skeptical. The studies highlighted
above have indicated that older adults may have impairments in
these mechanisms but do not address from a neuroanatomical
perspective why older adults are more vulnerable to deception
and misleading information, which often results in poor financial
decision-making.
Denburg et al. (2007) have indicated that the vulnerability to
misleading information in older adults may be linked to an impair-
ment in prefrontal cortex functioning. The structural integrity of
the prefrontal cortex is preferentially diminished relative to other
brain regions in some older adults (Dempster, 1992; Raz et al.,
1997; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005); and there is a decline in frontal lobe
functioning beyond the sixth decade of life (West, 1996; Phillips
et al., 2002). However, this leaves us with the question of how pre-
frontal cortex dysfunction results in vulnerability to misleading
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information. As another way of putting the question, what does
the prefrontal cortex do to prevent credulity and gullibility?
To address this question, Asp and Tranel (2012) recently devel-
oped the False Tagging Theory (FTT), a neuroanatomically based
theoretical model of belief and doubt processes. In brief, the FTT
asserts that (1) the process of belief occurs in two stages, men-
tal representation and assessment (Gilbert, 1991); (2) all ideas
that are represented are initially believed, but a secondary psy-
chological analysis (assessment) can produce disbelief (or doubt)
(Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert et al., 1993); (3) the mental representation
of the idea, which is initially believed or regarded as true, must be
“tagged” to indicate false value, producing doubt (Gilbert, 1991);
(4) the prefrontal cortex is necessary for the “false tag” in the
assessment component of belief; and (5) “false tags” are affective
in nature, akin to the central tenets of Damasio’s (1994) “somatic
marker hypothesis.” Our model suggests that the key function
of the prefrontal cortex is “false tagging” which, in the cognitive
domain, acts to doubt cognitive representations (which are initially
believed). The FTT views the prefrontal cortex as providing a sin-
gular function that multiple modalities can access and use (Asp
and Tranel, 2012); however, certain prefrontal regions are more
inclined to “false tag” for particular modalities, and we suggest
that the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is particularly
critical for false tagging cognitive representations. Therefore, the
ventromedial portion of the prefrontal cortex is of central inter-
est to the study of cognitive belief and doubt. Other prefrontal
regions may also play critical roles in doubting, e.g., acting as a false
tagging resource “reserve” (Asp and Tranel, 2012). However, this
study will focus exclusively on the vmPFC’s role in the belief and
doubt process. The FTT predicts that dysfunction of the vmPFC
should result in a “doubt deficit,” consequences of which should
be credulity and a tendency to believe inaccurate information.
Several preliminary studies have bolstered the theory, including
the findings that patients with focal damage to the vmPFC (1)
often have a general personality trait that is overconfident, boast-
ful, grandiose, obstinate, and egocentric (Stuss and Benson, 1984;
Damasio et al., 2011), indicating a lack of normative doubt; (2)
are more gullible to disreputable characters (Damasio, 1994; Croft
et al., 2010); and (3) are more likely to believe fundamentalist reli-
gious dogma (Asp et al., 2012). Thus, vmPFC patients and older
adults may have a vulnerability to believe deceptive or mislead-
ing information because vmPFC dysfunction impairs normative
doubt.
Under our FTT, beliefs are broad and cover all mental represen-
tation, including all cognitive representations such as knowledge,
ideas, opinions, attitudes, and rules (Asp and Tranel, 2012). Tra-
ditional perspectives of cognitive representation have suggested
that these cognitions are like tools in a warehouse; they are actual
objects in the brain that can be retrieved and used (Gilbert, 1993).
The underlying assumption is that cognitions in these models are
static; they are the bits, the 1’s and 0’s, of the mind’s computer.
There are several shortcomings to this computational view, most
notably, that (1) the mind’s “CPU” (the person getting the tools
from the warehouse) must perform homuncular-type operations
(e.g., Baddeley, 2002) and (2) cognitions are impotent (Gilbert,
1993). Computational models require a faculty or mechanism (a
“CPU”) to do action with static cognitions (the 1’s and 0’s), which
cannot produce effects on their own. However, the FTT asserts that
all cognitions are beliefs; they are “empowered” intrinsically with
simple comprehension (Gilbert, 1993). Thus, when an individual
understands a novel proposition, the individual is automatically
put in a “state” of belief. Here, the mental representation is not
impotent but will induce action, given appropriate circumstances.
To avoid every passing idea to be acted on, the vmPFC can doubt
or disbelieve cognitions by applying false tags to mental represen-
tations. Understanding a cognition is, then, more like the “state” of
a shot of an ice hockey player directed at a goalie. If the goalie does
not stop the shot (false tag the cognition), the shot will go in the
net (a cognition-consistent action will be performed). The belief
will be acted upon if not blocked by the vmPFC. In this model,
post-rolandic cortices are constantly firing shots and the vmPFC
is reliably blocking some percentage of them.
If this logic is applied to a decision-making scenario,each choice
that is identified (i.e., understood) is a belief (“if this, then that”
cognitions) and “false tags” block disadvantageous or inappropri-
ate choices for the context. False tags (or doubt) via the vmPFC
act to select appropriate responses during decision-making by neg-
atively biasing the inappropriate (i.e., “untrue”) representations.
Therefore, we propose that dysfunction or damage to the vmPFC
has a two-pronged, but intimately related, effect: (1) a tendency
toward credulity for deceptive or misleading information; and (2)
disadvantageous behavioral decision-making.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate credulity
and financial decision-making for misleading information pre-
sented in a real-world, ecologically valid paradigm (deceptive
advertising) in patients with focal brain damage, with the goal
of identifying a systems-level neuroanatomical correlate for these
cognitive functions. We chose consumer advertisements which had
been deemed deceptive and deliberately misleading by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), and examined participants’ credulity
toward the advertisements. Our theory suggests that when normal
individuals are exposed to misleading information they will ini-
tially believe the information but then will tend to self-generate
doubt from their store of knowledge and experience. To examine
the interaction between “self-generated” doubt and doubt from
explicit information, we created two types of misleading ads: (1)
“deceptive-uncorrected” ads, which are misleading and do not
have any explicit information that may induce doubting, and (2)
“deceptive-corrected” ads, which are misleading but do have an
end disclaimer which should induce doubting. The FTT asserts
that doubt is mediated by the vmPFC. Thus, we hypothesized that
patients with damage to the vmPFC, compared to patients with
brain damage outside the prefrontal cortex and healthy individu-
als, (1) would be more likely to believe the misleading aspects in
both the “deceptive-uncorrected” and the “deceptive-corrected”
ads, and (2) would indicate higher intention to purchase the
products featured in both types of ads.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
We studied 39 individuals with adult-onset brain lesions from
the Patient Registry of the Division of Behavioral Neurology
and Cognitive Neuroscience at the University of Iowa. The eti-
ologies of the lesions included cerebrovascular disease (n= 21),
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surgical resection for treatment of a meningioma or seizure con-
trol (n= 15), and focal contusions from trauma (n= 3). In con-
nection with their enrollment in the Patient Registry, the brain
damaged patients have been extensively characterized neuropsy-
chologically and neuroanatomically, using standard protocols of
the Benton Neuropsychology Laboratory and the Laboratory of
Brain Imaging and Cognitive Neuroscience (Tranel, 2007). Eigh-
teen patients had damage to the vmPFC and were classified into
our vmPFC group (Figure 1); while 21 patients had lesions outside
the prefrontal cortex and were classified into our brain damaged
comparison group (BDC; Figure 2). Patients with prefrontal cor-
tex damage to areas primarily outside the ventromedial regions
were excluded from analysis. While other prefrontal areas are pre-
dicted to have a role in “false tagging” it is beyond the scope
of this study to address more specific relationships within the
prefrontal cortices. All neuropsychological and neuroanatomical
data were collected in the chronic phase of recovery, at least 3
months post-lesion onset. We also included a normal comparison
group (n= 10) which was comprised by individuals of similar age
and education to our patient groups. BDC patients were slightly
FIGURE 1 | Lesion overlap of patients with ventromedial
prefrontal cortex lesions.The overlap map shows the lesions of
vmPFC patients displayed in anterior/mesial views and coronal
slices (a–f, with the right hemisphere on the left in the coronal
views). The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions
per voxel.
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FIGURE 2 | Lesion overlap of brain damage comparison patients.The overlap map shows the lesions of BDC patients displayed in ventral/lateral views and
coronal slices (a–f, with the right hemisphere on the left in the coronal views). The color bar indicates the number of overlapping lesions per voxel.
younger and had more females relative to males than our vmPFC
group and normal group (Table 1), so we corrected for these
differences in the main analyses. VMPFC patients had signifi-
cantly larger lesions relative to BDC patients (Table 1); thus, a
secondary analysis directly comparing credulity in the BDC and
vmPFC groups was conducted to account for lesion size. Par-
ticipants with significant language, memory, or visuoperceptual
deficits which might impair their ability to adequately complete the
task were excluded. We excluded patients with significant aphasia
(defined as two standard deviations below the mean on the Boston
Naming Test or the Token Test), reading deficits (defined as two
standard deviations below the mean on the Iowa Chapman Read-
ing Test), memory deficits (defined as two standard deviations
below the mean on the Auditory Verbal Learning Test delayed
recall or the Complex Figure Test delayed recall), or visuoper-
ceptual impairments (defined as two standard deviations below
the mean on the Facial Recognition Test). There were no signifi-
cant differences between vmPFC and BDC patients on the various
neuropsychological measures (Table 2). All participants were free
from mental retardation, learning disabilities, psychiatric disease,
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 100 | 4
Asp et al. Neural correlates of credulity
Table 1 | Demographic and neuroanatomical data.
vmPFC BDC Normal
Number 18 21 10
Age (SD)* 60.4 (10.6) 50.2 (11.0) 60.7 (8.9)
Education (SD) 13.8 (2.7) 14.3 (2.3) 15.8 (3.0)
Sex** 12 M; 6 F 6 M; 15 F 7 M; 3 F
Lesion size (SD)
†
51.7(40.3) 21.9 (15.3) NA
Age and education are presented in years; lesion size is presented in cubic cen-
timeters.
*BDC patients were significantly younger than vmPFC patients and normal par-
ticipants.
**The BDC group had a significantly lower proportion of males relative to females
than the vmPFC and normal groups.
†VMPFC lesions were significantly larger than BDC lesions.
Table 2 | Neuropsychological data for the lesion groups.
vmPFC BDC
WAIS III – FSIQ (SD) 108.5 (16.8) 104.7 (11.5)
WRAT – Read (SD) 99.4 (9.8) 96.6 (8.2)
AVLT – 30 min recall (SD) 8.5 (3.6) 9.2 (2.9)
CFT – 30 min recall (SD) 20.0 (7.5) 17.2 (5.4)
TMT – Part B (SD) 76.7 (34.9) 77.8 (43.2)
WCST – Pers. Errors (SD) 22.1 (24.7) 12.6 (8.1)
WAIS-III, Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III scores (FSIQ, full-scale IQ). WRAT,
Wide Range AchievementTest scores (Read, Reading Standard Score). AVLT, Audi-
tory Verbal Learning Test scores (an index of memory function at 30 min). CFT,
Complex Figure Test recall scores (an index of memory function at 30 min). TMT,
Trail Making Test Part B scores, an index of divided attention and multi-tasking.
WCST,Wisconsin Card SortingTest Perseverative Errors, an index of reasoning and
concept formation (executive functioning). There were no significant differences
between the groups for any of the neuropsychological tests.
substance abuse, and dementia. Participants gave informed con-
sent approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University
of Iowa.
STIMULI AND PROCEDURE
Participants were given a booklet that consisted of eight adver-
tisements that one might encounter in a magazine or newspaper.
Each ad was based on real-world misleading advertisements as
deemed by the rulings of the FTC, as shown in FTC Decisions
(Federal Trade Commission, 1991) and Complying with the Made
in USA Standard (Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, 1998). These advertisements were misleading
for a number of reasons, ranging from the withholding of crucial
information about the product to the use of biased graphs. For
example, in an advertisement for “Legacy Luggage,” the original
misleading version had the headline “Legacy brings you the finest
American Quality luggage.” The FTC stated that any advertise-
ment that has “American Quality” on it conveys that the item in
question was made in the U.S.A. In fact, the luggage was actu-
ally not made in the U.S.A., but instead was manufactured in
Mexico, and then inspected in Tennessee, and thus was mislead-
ing. Three ads were classified as “deception-uncorrected” and were
left unchanged from the FTC-ruled “misleading advertisement”
classification. However, “deception-uncorrected” ads assume that
all individuals have a similar knowledge base regarding potential
objections to the misleading portions of the ads. This assumption
leaves open the possibility that some individuals may not have, or
cannot access, cognitions that should induce doubting. To address
this issue, we developed “deception-corrected” ads which provide
explicit information that should induce doubting, by modifying
three misleading ads with a disclaimer at the end of the ad. The dis-
claimers in the “deception-corrected” ads specifically rebutted the
misleading aspect of the ad. For example, in an advertisement for
“NatureCure,” the misleading ad describes a natural pain reliever
that provides relief from headaches “without the side effects of
over-the-counter pain relievers.” The end disclaimer refutes this
claim by noting, “This product can cause nausea in some con-
sumers when taken regularly.” Thus, for the “deception-corrected”
ads, all participants were given the same specific knowledge to
doubt the misleadingly advertised claim. Finally, there were two
“filler” advertisements, one placed at the beginning and the other
at the end of the booklet. These were used to help buffer against
primacy and recency effects, and were not scored. This left six
critical advertisements: three “deception-uncorrected” and three
“deception-corrected.” Each ad highlighted a distinct product: the
“deception-uncorrected” stimuli advertised a doll, luggage, and
a vitamin supplement drink; the “deception-corrected” stimuli
advertised a car, a pain reliever, and mutual funds. Participants
read over the advertisements at their own pace and when finished,
they were given a paper questionnaire which assessed participant
reactions to each advertisement and product. Participants could
not refer back to the advertisements during the questionnaire;
instead, they needed to recall their impressions of each product
from memory. Readers who are interested in knowing more about
the advertising stimuli and their development may contact the
senior author via email.
Two critical dimensions were assessed for each advertisement:
(1) credulity toward the misleading aspect of the advertisement,
and (2) purchase intention, i.e., how likely was the participant
to buy each item should it become available in their area. The
credulity measure asked “What do you believe to be true about this
product?” and was assessed on a Likert scale, anchored at each end
by a belief about the product being advertised. The Likert scales on
the questionnaire contained no numerals but had 7 empty spaces
(of equal size) between the two anchors. Participants marked the
empty space they considered appropriate. Numbers for the Likert
scale were added post hoc, and ranged from 1 to 7, with lower values
reflecting increased belief in the misleading aspects of the ads and
higher values reflecting increased skepticism for the misleading
aspects of the ads. For example, the previously mentioned Legacy
Luggage advertisement dealt with whether or not the luggage was
made in the U.S.A. The credulity question concerning that adver-
tisement was anchored at space 1 by “The Legacy Luggage Set is
made in the United States” and at space 7 by “The Legacy Luggage
Set is NOT made in the United States.” The purchase intention
measure was assessed by asking, “What is the probability that you
would buy the product when it becomes available in the area?”
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Participants’ responses were measured on a Likert scale, anchored
by “Likely” and “Unlikely.” This scale ranged from 1 to 5, with 1
reflecting a higher intention to purchase the item and 5 reflecting
a lower intention to purchase the item.
NEUROANATOMICAL ANALYSIS
The neuroanatomical analysis of the vmPFC and BDC patients
(Figures 1 and 2) was based on magnetic resonance data for 30
patients and on computerized tomography data for 9 patients.
Using Brainvox (Frank et al., 1997), each patient’s lesion was recon-
structed in three dimensions for the different groups. The lesion
contour for each patient was manually warped into a normal tem-
plate brain using the MAP-3 method. The overlap of lesions in
these volumes, calculated by the sum of n lesions overlapping at
any single voxel, is color-coded in Figures 1 and 2. As Figure 1
shows, the greatest overlap of vmPFC patient lesions is in the
mesial orbital region, especially the anterior half of the gyrus
rectus. The greatest overlap of lesions in Figure 2 is in the infe-
rior temporal lobes. No BDC lesions encompassed the prefrontal
cortex.
RESULTS
All statistical t -tests are one-tailed in accordance with our
directional predictions.
CREDULITY DIMENSION
The first question we addressed was whether patients with
vmPFC damage were more likely to be credulous to the mislead-
ing advertising overall (including both “deception-uncorrected”
and “deception-corrected”). VMPFC patients were more credu-
lous to the misleading advertising (M = 3.89, SD= 1.11) than
BDC patients (M = 5.25, SD= 0.81) and normal participants
(M = 5.10, SD= 0.88; Figure 3). Because BDC patients were
slightly younger and had more females relative to males (Table 1),
we ran an ANCOVA with age and sex as covariates. The covari-
ate, age, was not significantly related to credulity, F(1,44)= 0.01,
p= 0.93; and the covariate, sex, was also not significantly related
to credulity,F(1,44)= 0.01,p= 0.92. There remained a significant
difference in group credulity after controlling for the covariates,
F(2,44)= 9.26, p< 0.001. Planned contrasts revealed that vmPFC
patients were more credulous than BDC patients, t (44)= 3.17,
p= 0.002, and normal participants, t (44)= 3.88, p< 0.001.
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex patients had significantly larger
lesions that BDC patients (Table 1) and there was a modest cor-
relation between lesion size and credulity to the ads, r =−0.31,
p= 0.06. Thus, a secondary analysis was conducted to directly
examine the influence of lesion size on the credulity measure in the
two patient groups. The covariate, lesion size, was not significantly
related to credulity, F(1,36)= 0.12, p= 0.74. There remained a
significant difference in group credulity after controlling for the
covariate, F(1,36)= 13.70, p= 0.001.
Splitting the overall credulity results into the three “deception-
uncorrected” ads and the three “deception-corrected” ads helps
clarify our initial analysis. VMPFC patients were more credu-
lous to the “deception-uncorrected” ads (M = 3.24, SD= 1.38)
than BDC patients (M = 4.86, SD= 1.03) and normal partici-
pants (M = 4.83, SD= 1.47; Figure 3). There was a significant
FIGURE 3 | Mean belief scores for misleading ads.The scale is from 1 to
7 (y -axis), with lower values corresponding to increased belief in misleading
aspects of the ads and higher values corresponding to increased skepticism
for misleading aspects of the ads. Error bars indicate SEM. The graph on
the left of the black bar represents results for all six misleading ads; the
graph on the right of the black bar breaks the results down according to
“deception-uncorrected” and “deception-corrected” ads. For all the ads,
vmPFC patients had more credulity than BDC patients and normal
comparison participants.
difference for group credulity on the “deception-uncorrected” ads,
F(2,46)= 9.25, p< 0.001. Planned contrasts revealed that vmPFC
patients were more credulous than BDC patients, t (46)= 4.18,
p< 0.001, and normal participants, t (46)= 3.20, p= 0.002.
vmPFC patients were also more credulous to the “deception-
corrected” ads (M = 4.54, SD= 1.17) than BDC patients
(M = 5.64, SD= 1.13) and normal participants (M= 5.37,
SD= 0.85; Figure 2). There was a significant difference for
group credulity on the “deception-corrected” ads, F(2,46)= 5.06,
p= 0.01. Planned contrasts revealed that vmPFC patients were
more credulous than BDC patients, t (46)= 2.90, p= 0.003, and
normal participants, t (46)= 1.92, p= 0.03. These data suggest
that higher credulity toward misleading ads in vmPFC patients
was obtained even when explicit disclaimers should induce doubt
for the misleading information.
A secondary repeated measures ANOVA analysis was con-
ducted to see if the “correction” in the ads had a significant main
effect. While the participants were generally more skeptical for the
“deception-corrected” ads, there was not a significant main effect
of “correction,” F(1,44)= 0.15, p= 0.70. In addition, the groups
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were not significantly different in the way they were affected by the
presence of corrective information,F(2,44)= 1.02,p= 0.37. Thus,
the corrective information did help the vmPFC patients increase
their skepticism similarly to the comparison groups.
PURCHASE INTENTION DIMENSION
For the purchase intention dimension, we addressed first whether
vmPFC patients overall were more likely to have intent to purchase
the advertised products. VMPFC patients had higher purchase
intention for the misleadingly advertised products (M = 4.17,
SD= 0.64) than BDC patients (M= 4.40, SD= 0.43) and normal
participants (M= 4.70, SD= 0.27; Figure 4). Again, we used age
and sex as covariates in an ANCOVA analysis. The covariate, age,
was not significantly related to purchase intention,F(1,44)= 0.93,
p= 0.34; and the covariate, sex, was also not significantly related
to purchase intention, F(1,44)= 2.17, p= 0.15. There remained a
significant difference in purchase intention after controlling for the
covariates, F(2,44)= 3.75, p= 0.03. Planned contrasts revealed
that vmPFC patients had significantly higher purchase intention
than normal participants, t (44)= 2.74,p= 0.005; vmPFC patients
FIGURE 4 | Mean purchase intention scores for misleading ads.The
scale is from 1 to 5 (y -axis). Lower values reflect increased purchase
intention for the products misleadingly advertised, and higher values reflect
decreased purchase intention. Error bars indicate SEM. The graph on the
left of the black bar represents results for all six misleading ads; the graph
on the right of the black bar breaks the results down according to
“deception-uncorrected” and “deception-corrected” ads. For all the ads,
vmPFC patients had higher purchase intention than BDC patients and
normal comparison participants for the products in the misleading ads.
did not have significantly higher purchase intention than the BDC
patients, t (44)= 1.13, p= 0.13. Lesion size was uncorrelated with
purchase intention, r = 0.04, p= 0.81.
When the purchase intention data were divided into
“deception-uncorrected” and “deception-corrected,” the results
indicated that vmPFC patients had higher purchase intent for
the “deception-uncorrected” ads (M = 4.35, SD= 0.70) than
BDC patients (M = 4.52, SD= 0.39) and normal participants
(M = 4.90, SD= 0.16; Figure 4). There was a significant difference
for group purchase intention on the “deception-uncorrected” ads,
F(2,46)= 3.86, p= 0.03. Planned contrasts showed that vmPFC
patients had higher purchase intention than normal participants,
t (20)=−3.18, p= 0.003; but did not significantly differ from
BDC patients, t (26)=−0.93, p= 0.18. VMPFC patients also had
higher purchase intent to the“deception-corrected”ads (M = 4.00,
SD= 0.67) than BDC patients (M = 4.27, SD= 0.72) and normal
participants (M = 4.50, SD= 0.45; Figure 3). However, group dif-
ferences on “deception-corrected” ads for purchase intention did
not reach significance, F(2,46)= 1.99, p= 0.14. Planned contrasts
revealed that vmPFC patients had significantly higher purchase
intention than normal participants, t (46)=−1.94, p= 0.03; but
did not significantly differ from BDC patients, t (46)=−1.28,
p= 0.11.
DISCUSSION
Our findings support the hypothesis that credulity toward mis-
leading information can result from damage to the vmPFC.
Patients with vmPFC damage tended to (1) believe misleading
advertisements, and (2) show higher intent to purchase the prod-
ucts featured in the misleading advertisements, relative to patients
with brain damage outside of the prefrontal cortex and normal
comparison participants. Remarkably, the pattern of credulity
results was evident even when vmPFC patients were given specific
information that rebuts the misleading claim. This suggests that
the deficiency in vmPFC patients is specific to the doubt process,
not a lack of knowledge regarding misleading information. Thus,
the results indicate that given a deceptive ad (with or without a dis-
claimer) vmPFC patients are more credulous. The disclaimer did
increase skepticism in vmPFC patients (similarly to the compari-
son groups) but overall the disclaimer did not produce normative
skeptical levels in vmPFC patients. Thus, there is a deficiency in
skepticism generally, even when specific rebutting knowledge cues
a doubting process.
The conclusion that damage to the vmPFC causes an increase in
credulity to misleading information is bolstered by the facts that
(1) brain damage, per se, when outside of the prefrontal cortex,
does not account for the results (as evident from the BDC data);
(2) demographic variables such as age, education, or sex, per se, do
not account for the results; and (3) general cognitive functioning,
such as intelligence, memory, reading performance, or executive
functioning, per se, does not account for the results. Instead, the
vmPFC patients’ deficit in skepticism to the misleading informa-
tion is specific to their lesion location and is not accounted for by
generally poor cognitive functioning.
The vmPFC patients did have larger lesions relative to the BDC
patients (Table 1). However, it is unlikely that lesion size, per se,
influenced the credulity or purchase intention results. A detailed
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analysis revealed: (1) lesion size as a covariate was not significantly
related to credulity, and (2) when the patients were ranked on the
credulity measure (the total ads together), the top 5 most credu-
lous vmPFC patients (M = 28.8, SD= 15.5) actually had a slightly
smaller mean lesion size than the bottom 5 least credulous BDC
patients (M = 29.6, SD= 23.7). Moreover, an appropriate lesion
size measure interpretation must be understood in the context
of the region which is damaged. Small lesions to critical struc-
tures such as the amygdala, hippocampus, or thalamic nuclei may
critically impair a variety of functions, while a similar size lesion
to the relatively large and uniform vmPFC may not have simi-
lar functional disruptions. Thus, lesion size, per se, while different
between the two groups, was unlikely to contribute to the increased
credulity and purchase intent in the vmPFC group relative to the
BDC group, i.e., the deficit is specific not to lesion size but to lesion
location.
Our findings support the FTT, which posits that the prefrontal
cortex is critical in mediating doubt (Asp and Tranel, 2012), and
thus damage to the critical ventromedial region of the prefrontal
cortex should result in a “doubt deficit.” While it has been noted
that ventromedial prefrontal patients are often vulnerable to shady
business ventures and snake-oil salesmen (Damasio, 1994), the
current study provides the first direct evidence beyond anecdotal
reports that damage to vmPFC increases credulity. Indeed, this
specific deficit may explain why highly intelligent vmPFC patients
can fall victim to seemingly obvious fraud schemes. Warnings from
friends and family often go unheeded and vmPFC patients’ sus-
ceptibility can result in bankruptcy if they continue to make their
own financial decisions. Moreover, in the acute phase of recov-
ery following vmPFC damage, patients often confabulate and are
markedly suggestible (Berlyne, 1972) to other individuals and, on
rare occasions, even to the environment around them (Lhermitte,
1986). Taken together, this evidence indicates that the vmPFC is
a critical neural structure preventing unwarranted belief toward
unscrupulous companies or individuals who try to bilk one’s
money.
In our study, we gave novel external persuasive information
to vmPFC patients and found that they tend to be credulous
to that information. However, as suggested in the Introduction,
vmPFC patients can also be obstinate and bull-headed toward
novel information. Intuitively, it may appear contradictory that
an individual can both be credulous and rigidly obstinate to infor-
mation. Yet, this is the strange state often exhibited by patients
with vmPFC damage. We hypothesize that the critical factor deter-
mining the easy acceptance or rigid rejection of information in
vmPFC patients is whether the cognitive representation is initially
generated by external or internal information. If the cognitive
representation is initially generated by external information (as
in the present study), it is believed, but then it fails to be falsi-
fied by comparisons with extant mental information. Thus, the
new information is not doubted, and credulity ensues. If the
cognitive representation is initially generated by internal informa-
tion, it is believed, but then it fails to be falsified by comparisons
with new external information. Thus, the old information is not
doubted, and a pertinacious belief is evinced. This suggests the
initial cognition is always first believed and it is the comparison
and falsification to other beliefs that is disrupted. vmPFC patients,
then, should have “compartmentalized minds,” where discordant
ideas are rarely compared and falsified with one another. Indeed,
vmPFC patients tend to be high in authoritarianism (Asp et al.,
2012), a trait highlighted by a capacity to hold mutual agreement
of contradictory ideas (Altemeyer, 1996). vmPFC patients are also
prone to pathological confabulation, where they truly believe their
(sometimes florid) assertions, even though contradictory evidence
to these assertions is salient and obvious (Gilboa and Moscovitch,
2002).
Our results also indicated that vmPFC patients had higher
intention to purchase the misleadingly advertised products than
BDC or normal comparisons. Undoubtedly, other, independent
factors outside the study’s design likely have stronger influences
during an actual purchase decision process (e.g., the usefulness of
the product and available financial means for an individual), than
a single misleadingly advertised product aspect. These indepen-
dent factors may have differentially affected the purchase intention
data; e.g., the participants gave higher purchase intention ratings
to the “deception-corrected” ads compared to the “deception-
uncorrected” ads. Thus, because the experimental design used
different (and unmatched) products across the types of ads, other
issues such as usefulness and monetary concerns probably factored
greater in the participants’ purchase intention.
However, it is notable that vmPFC patients had the highest
purchase intent of any group. VMPFC patients are notorious for
their poor decision-making in financial and social situations. They
often claim that an inappropriate decision “feels right”; and there
is substantial evidence suggesting that vmPFC patients lack affec-
tive signals which normally steer individuals toward advantageous
decisions (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1996, 2000). The FTT
asserts that the cognitive process which selects the item eventually
chosen from a decision-making process is governed by doubt (or
false tags) which are affective in nature (Asp and Tranel, 2012).
As an individual mentally represents each potential choice, the
vmPFC acts to “doubt” or to negatively bias the inappropriate
or undesirable representations away from a behavioral action.
Appropriate or desirable response selection, then, is the result of
the “fittest” choice representation; i.e., the representation with the
least negative biases (or false tags) attached to it. Here, we suggest
the cognition to purchase a specific item is a belief and individuals
must“false tag”this belief with other extant cognitive information.
For instance, in regard to the “Legacy Luggage” we propose that
normal individuals believe the initial cognition“I will purchase the
Legacy Luggage” but then “falsify” that cognition with discordant
extant cognitions, e.g.,“I just bought new luggage” or “I don’t have
time to go on any trips.”Other product aspects (including the mis-
leading aspects) may play a role in the purchase decision, e.g., “It
is made in the US” (strengthening the belief) or “The color of the
luggage is unappealing” (increasing false tags) as well. Although
we cannot specify what potential cognitions individuals may offer
for falsification, in this decision-making scenario, vmPFC patients
should be more likely to intend to purchase advertised products.
Our results provide some initial evidence for this view.
We believe our results have implications that extend beyond
unethical marketing campaigns, although they do directly impact
marketing ethics in brain damaged individuals. This study adds
to the growing evidence that belief and disbelief are not governed
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by balanced cognitive processes (Gilbert, 1991). Belief is first, easy,
inexorable with comprehension of any cognition, and substan-
tiated by representations in the post-rolandic cortex. Disbelief is
retroactive, difficult, vulnerable to disruption, and mediated by the
vmPFC. This asymmetry in the process of belief and doubt sug-
gests that false doctrines in the “marketplace of ideas” (Mill, 1975)
may not be as benign as is often assumed (Gilbert et al., 1993).
Indeed, normal individuals are prone to misleading information,
propaganda, fraud, and deception (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Gilbert,
1991), especially in situations where their cognitive resources are
depleted. In our theory, the more effortful process of disbelief
(to items initially believed) is mediated by the vmPFC; which, in
old age, tends to disproportionally lose structural integrity and
associated functionality. Thus, we suggest that vulnerability to
misleading information, outright deception, and fraud in older
persons is the specific result of a deficit in the doubt process which
is mediated by the vmPFC.
To conclude, the present findings suggest that the vmPFC
is a critical neural substrate for psychological doubt affecting
post-rolandic representations. Damage to the vmPFC disrupts a
“false tagging mechanism” which normally produces doubt and
skepticism for cognitive representations.
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